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SUA SPONTE INSTRUCTIONS
only with reference to instructions in cases in which the defendant,
having pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, has already introduced
evidence of mental disorder. Hopefully, when the issue presented to
the court is the admissibility of such evidence to show lack of capacity
to premeditate, the court will give diminished responsibility more serious
consideration.
JOHN H. BODDIE
Criminal Law-Sua Sponte Instructions on Defendant's Failure
to Testify
Section 8-54 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that a
defendant in a criminal action is a competent witness but that the
defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf "shall not create any
presumption against him."' In several decisions,' the most recent of
which is State v. Caron,3 the North Carolina Supreme Court has dealt
with the issue of whether it is error under section 8-54 for the judge, on
his own initiative, to instruct the jury that the defendant has a right not to
testify and that no adverse inference is to be drawn from the defendant's
silence. Other state and federal courts, dealing with similar statutes,
have divided4 as to whether such an instruction, given without a defend-
ant's request, so sensitizes the jury to the defendant's silence that an
inference of guilt may arise or an existing adverse inference may be
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1969) provides:
Defendant in criminal action competent but not compellable to testify.
-In the trial of all indictments, complaints, or other proceedings against per-
sons charged with the commission of crimes, offenses or misdemeanors, the
person so charged is, at his own request, but not otherwise, a competent
witness, and his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption
against him. But every such person examined as a witness shall be subject
to cross-examination as other witnesses. Except as above provided, nothing in
this section shall render any person, who in any criminal proceeding is charged
with the commission of a criminal offense, competent or compellable to give
evidence against himself, nor render any person compellable to answer any
question tending to criminate himself.
2. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 208 S.E.2d 696 (1974); State v. Bryant, 283
N.C. 227, 195 S.E.2d 509 (1973); State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 180 S.E.2d 115
(1971); State v. Paige, 272 N.C. 417, 158 S.E.2d 522 (1968); State v. Rainey, 236 N.C.
738, 74 S.E.2d 39 (1953); State v. Wood, 230 N.C. 740, 55 S.E.2d 491 (1949); State v.
McNeill, 229 N.C. 377, 49 S.E.2d 733 (1948); State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 5 S.E.2d
156 (1939); State v. Home, 209 N.C. 725, 184 S.E. 470 (1936).
3. 288 N.C. 467, 219 S.E.2d 68 (1975).
4. See Annot, 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1968) for a compilation of these cases.
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strengthened. In State v. Caron the court repeated its frequently stated
assertion that the better practice is to "give no instruction concerning a
defendant's failure to testify unless such an instruction is requested by
defendant,"5 but declined to hold a sua sponte instruction to be reversi-
ble error.
Defendant Caron was tried and convicted in Wake County Superi-
or Court for feloniously setting fire to a building that housed his body
and paint shop. The defense called witnesses to testify, but the accused
himself did not take the stand.' Although the defendant did not
request an instruction on his right to have no adverse inference drawn
from his failure to testify, the court charged the jury as follows:
"I recall that the defendant, even though he offered evidence,
he did not take the stand and testify in his own behalf. Now,
I make mention of that fact for this purpose. I have told you
that he had no responsibility to offer any evidence, had a right
to but no responsibility to; that he owed you no duty to offer any
evidence; that the State had the whole burden and has the whole
burden of proof throughout this case. Now that being so, he had
an absolute right under the law to try his lawsuit in the fashion
that he decided that it ought to be tried. He had a right to offer
no evidence. If he offered any, he had a right to remain off the
stand. You can't punish any man for exercising a lawful right.
So I give emphasis to this fact: The fact that the defendant did
not testify does not permit you to speculate about why he did not.
He has exercised a lawful right. You may not take the position
during your deliberations did he have something he didn't want
us to know. He has exercised the lawful right and you may not
hold it against him to any extent the fact that he did not testify.
You must deal with what you have before you in this evidence
and you may not hold against the defendant a'tall the fact that
he did not testify."'7
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
5. 288 N.C. at 472-73, 219 S.E.2d at 72, quoting State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449,
457, 180 S.E.2d 115, 120 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972).
6. The evidence against defendant showed that he increased the first insurance
coverage on his business several days before the fire; defendant had purchased a fifty-five
gallon drum of lacquer thinner the day before the fire; lacquer thinner had apparently
been poured in a trail throughout the shop and then ignited; defendant admitted being in
the building shortly before the fire; and when notified of the blaze by the fire
department, defendant arrived on the scene in a less-than-pristine state-that is, his
hands, clothes, and face were coated with soot-a phenomenon that the defendant was
unable to explain at the time. Defendant presented evidence that his accountant
recommended the increased insurance coverage and that he was "habitually dirty" from
his work in the body shop. 288 N.C. at 470-71, 219 S.E.2d at 70-71.
7. 288 N.C. at 471-72, 219 S.E.2d at 71.
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Moore upholding the court of appeals, 8 found the instruction "unduly
repetitious" but "not prejudicial."9 Although noting that some jurisdic-
tions hold such instructions erroneous when not requested by defendant
and that the North Carolina Supreme Court itself had suggested that
such a charge not be given unless requested by defendant, the majority
concluded that the "spirit of G.S. 8-54 [had] been complied with.""'
In dissent, Chief Justice Sharp, joined by Justice Exum, chided the
majority for "disregard[ing] this Court's repeated admonition that 'it is
better to give no instruction concerning failure of defendant to testify
unless he requests it.""' To the majority's holding that the undue
repetitions in the charge were not prejudicial, the Chief Justice replied,
"This conclusion ignores the fact that certain medicines taken in small
doses may effect a cure while a large dose of the same medicine, or a
small one indiscriminately repeated, can be fatal."12 Finally, of the trial
judge's admonition not to speculate on the reasons for defendant's
absence from the stand, the dissent concluded, "[tio prohibit this
thought was to suggest it."' 3
At common law parties to legal actions were not allowed to testify.
In the mid-nineteenth century, however, North Carolina and many other
states enacted statutes making parties competent witnesses. The ques-
tion remained whether the removal of a defendant's inability to testify
should produce an inference of guilt when defendant failed to use his
opportunity to attest to his innocence. In 1881 North Carolina enacted
the predecessor of section 8-54,1r which allowed criminal defendants to
remain silent without a presumption of guilt being created.' 6 Like its
predecessor, the current statute is an attempt to give meaning to a
defendant's constitutionally mandated protection from compulsory self-
incrimination.17 If silence were permitted to raise an inference of guilt,
the defendant's choice of whether or not to testify would be a meaning-
less one, for his decision to testify would subject him to questioning that
8. State v. Caron, 26 N.C. App. 456, 215 S.E.2d 878 (1975).
9. 288 N.C. at 473, 219 S.E.2d at 72.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 474, 219 S.E.2d at 72, quoting State v. Bryant, 283 N.C. 227, 232, 195
S.E.2d 509, 512 (1973).
12. 288 N.C. at 474, 219 S.E.2d at 73.
13. Id.
14. State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 479, 112 S.E.2d 61, 71 (1960); 8 J. WrGmoRE,
EvIDENC E § 2272, at 427 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
15. N.C. Rev. Stat. ch. 89 (1881), as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-54 (1969).
16. State v. Walker, 251 N.C. 465, 479, 112 S.E.2d 61, 71 (1960).
17. See Note, Comments to the Jury on Defendant's Failure to Testify, 64 DicK. L.
REv. 164 (1960).
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could produce evidence of his guilt, while his decision not to testify
would be treated as evidence of guilt.
In Bruno v. United States8 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted a federal statute 9 worded almost identically to section 8-54
of the North Carolina General Statutes.2 0  The Court held the statute to
mean that when the defendant requests a federal judge to so charge, the
judge is required to instruct the jury of defendant's right to silence and
of the absence of any presumption of guilt resulting from his silence.2 1
Although dealing with the problem in a different context, the Court in
Bruno raised the same issue that underlies cases in which the defendant
objects to or fails to request the instruction: how does the jury react to
an instruction to ignore the defendant's silence. It was argued in Bruno
that the defendant was not harmed by the judge's refusal to comply with
the requested instruction since, had it been given, the charge would only
have directed the jury's attention to the defendant's failure to testify and
thus heightened the natural inference of guilt that arises when the jurors
learn that the defendant will not testify. The Court found that, "[by
legislating against the creation of any 'presumption' from a failure to
testify, Congress could not have meant to legislate against the psychol-
ogical operation of the jury's mind. 22 Congress's intent, rather, was to
allow the accused "to make his own choice" of whether the jury should
be instructed, by balancing the risk of highlighting his failure to testify
against the advantage of informing the jury of the "no presumption"
principle. 23
Some legal scholars and jurists have also doubted the efficacy of
such instructions regarding defendant's failure to testify.2 4  Professor
Wigmore, for example, thought that a natural inference of guilt arises
18. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
19. The statute provided that in federal criminal trials "the person so charged shall,
at his own request but not otherwise, be a competent witness. And his failure to make
such request shall not create any presumption against him." Act of March 16, 1878, ch.
37, 20 Stat. 30, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1969).
20. Compare statute quoted at note 19 supra, with statute quoted at note I supra.
21. 308 U.S. at 293.
22. Id. at 293.
23. Id. at 294.
24. An interesting study which lends support to this point of view is cited at Note,
The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REv. 264, 266
(1966). The University of Chicago Jury Project found that experimental juries reacted
to an instruction to disregard evidence by becoming even more aware of the evidence.
When defendants in negligence suits disclosed they had insurance and no objection was
made, the average verdict was $33,000. When defendants disclosed that they were in-
sured, the plaintiff objected and the judge instructed the jury to disregard the evidence,
the average verdict was $46,000.
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when jurors observe the defendant's failure to take the stand and that
instructing a jury to ignore this inference is useless. "It is well enough
to contrive artificial fictions for use by lawyers, but to attempt to enlist
the layman in the process of nullifying his own reasoning powers is
merely futile, and tends toward confusion and a disrespect for the law's
reasonableness."25  One judge, arguing for eliminating the required
instruction, stated that doing so "'would cure . . a species of legal
hypocrisy whereby courts and jurors are compelled to assume an ap-
pearance of disregarding and forgetting something which is practically
impossible for either of them to disregard or forget.' "26
While a natural inference probably does arise from the accused's
failure to take the stand, courts have generally rejected the arguments
for entirely eliminating the instruction. Some have stressed that the law
presumes the innocence of defendants and that therefore the accused
should be allowed to attempt to minimize any existing adverse inference
either by choosing to instruct the jury of the presumption or by choosing
not to further emphasize his silence.
Not all courts, however, recognize the right to a choice in cases in
which the defendant does not desire the instruction. The Bruno
Court,28 in upholding the defendant's right to the instruction when
requested, noted that knowledge of the human mind was not so certain
as to "justify us in disregarding the will of Congress by a dogmatic
assumption that jurors, if properly admonished, neither could nor would
heed the instructions of the trial court that the failure of an accused to
be a witness in his own cause 'shall not create any presumnption against
him.' "29 In United States v. Garguilo3  Judge Friendly for the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on the above quotation from
Bruno to find that there was no error when the same instruction was
given in the absence of a request by the accused. Noting the natural
adverse inference that arises from defendant's failure to testify, Judge
Friendly thus found it quite possible that the instruclion would be
helpful rather than prejudicial since it is not known that the jury could
not or would not heed the instruction.3 1 The Second Circuit thereby
25. J. WiGMOm!, supra note 14, at 436.
26. Hiscock, Criminal Law and Procedure in New York, 26 COLUM. L Rnv. 253,
259 (1926), quoted in L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AmEN TmE FIFT= AMENDMENT 22
(1959).
27. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 73 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
28. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
29. 308 U.S. at 294.
30. 310 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1962).
31. Id. at 252.
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interpreted Bruno in such a way as to allow removal of the very choice
that the Bruno decision had provided.
Although the United States Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v.
California32 has furnished the rationale for some courts' decisions that
the unrequested instruction is erroneous, it has been seen by other courts
as not preventing a contrary conclusion.33 Griffin held that the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution forbid
comment by the court on the accused's silence.34 The Griffin case dealt
with an instruction that defendant's silence could be considered by the
jury as evidence of his guilt. The debate about Griffin's meaning has
centered around whether Griffin forbids only those instructions that
allow adverse inferences or whether Griffin's sanction against "com-
ment" extends to an unrequested charge that no adverse inference is
allowed.35
In State v. Bryant"6 the North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted
Griffin as barring only an instruction that defendant's silence was
evidence of guilt.3 7 While the North Carolina court has held that, in the
absence of a request by the accused, section 8-54 does not create a duty
for the judge to instruct that silence creates no inference of guilt, 8 the
court has frequently suggested that the instruction not be given unless
requested by the defendant.3 9 Despite these repeated admonitions, the
court has found prejudicial error in the sua sponte instruction in only
two cases, and in both cases the judge informed the jury of the defend-
ant's right not to testify but failed to mention that no adverse inference
could arise from the exercise of that right.40  These two instructions
32. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
33. Many of these cases are collected at 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1968).
34. 380 U.S. at 613.
35. 18 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1968).
36. 283 N.C. 227, 195 S.E.2d 509 (1973).
37. Id. at 233, 195 S.E.2d at 513.
38. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 738, 208 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1974); State v.
Bryant, 283 N.C. 227, 231, 195 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1973); State v. Rainey, 236 N.C. 738,
741, 74 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1953); State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 365, 5 S.E.2d 156, 161
(1939).
39. State v. Bryant, 283 N.C. 227, 233-34, 195 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1973); State v.
Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 457, 180 S.E.2d 115, 120 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023
1972); State v. Jordan, 216 N.C. 356, 366, 5 S.E.2d 156, 161 (1939).
40. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 738, 208 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1974) (instruction
that defendants "'did not offer any evidence as they have a right to do' was prejudicial
error since it failed to instruct the jury "correctly and completely"). State v. Rainey,
236 N.C. 738, 740-41, 74 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1953) (error in mentioning defendant's right to
silence without noting presumption of innocence, but held harmless error since presump-
tion was mentioned three times elsewhere in the charge).
1006 [Vol. 54
SUA SPONTE INSTRUCTIONS
were erroneous because they were incomplete statements of the law, not
because any right of the defendant would be violated if the judge gave
the full instruction without a request by the defendant.41
Even accepting the notion that the unsolicited instruction is not
error per se, the phrasing of instructions such as the one given in
Caron,42 which repeatedly emphasizes defendant's silence, could certain-
ly prejudice the defendant. It is the wording of instructions rather than
the fact that an instruction was given that the court has criticized most
often.48  The North Carolina courts have frequently urged that the
language of the statute itself be used in giving the instruction,44 and
since 1973, a pattern instruction has been available.45 Yet instructions
such as that in Caron continue to be given, and only two supreme court
justices have been willing to go beyong a suggestion that more "com-
mendable" language could be used.46
Adoption of the view that the sua sponte charge of "no presump-
tion of guilf' is reversible error would raise the question of the proper
procedure to use at trial. The rule of Bruno v. United States47 and the
similar North Carolina case, State v. Rainey,48 should be retained: when
defendant requests the instruction that no inference arises from his
failure to testify, the trial judge is required to so charge the jury. This
41. State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 738-39, 208 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1974):
While it was not error for the court, in the absence of a request by the defend-
ant, to instruct the jury correctly and completely on this point, any instruction
thereon is incomplete and prejudicially erroneous unless it makes clear to thejury that the defendant has the right to offer or to refrain from offering evi-
dence as he sees fit and that his failure to testify should not be considered by
the jury as basis for any inference adverse to him.
42. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
43. E.g., State v. Caron, 288 N.C. 467, 473, 219 S.E.2d 68, 72 (1975) ("we do not
commend the instruction given . . . as it was unduly repetitious"); State v. Baxter, 285
N.C. 735, 738, 208 S.E.2d 696, 698 (1974) (charge was "incomplete statement"); State
v. Bryant, 283 N.C. 227, 233-34, 195 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1973) ("we do not approve the
language chosen"); State v. Barbour, 278 N.C. 449, 457, 180 S.E.2d 115, 120 (1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1023 (1972) ("the instruction is meager and is not commended");
State v. Paige, 272 N.C. 417, 423, 158 S.E.2d 522, 527 (1968) ("infelicitous choice of
words").
44. E.g., State v. McNeill, 229 N.C. 377, 379, 49 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1948); State v.
Caron, 26 N.C. App. 456, 460, 215 S.E.2d 878, 880 (1975); State v. Powell, 11 N.C.
App. 465, 474, 181 S.E.2d 745, 760 (1971).
45. NoRTH CAROLINA PATrENM INSTRffCrONS--CIM. 101.30 (1973). It reads:
"The defendant in this case has not testified. The law of North Carolina gives him this
privilege. This same law also assures him that his decision not to testify creates no pre-
sumption against him. Therefore, his silence is not to influence your decision in any
way.$,
46. See State v. Caron, 288 N.C. 467, 474, 219 S.E.2d 68, 72 (1975) (Sharp &
Exum, JJ., dissenting).
47. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
48. 236 N.C. 738, 74 S.E.2d 39 (1953).
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rule protects the defendant who fears that the jury may attach undue
significance to his silence and who yet believes that the judge's instruc-
tion has the potential of diminishing the adverse inference that naturally
arises from his silence.4"
Currently in North Carolina, attorneys are not required to request
instructions on "substantive" features of a case, while they must request
an instruction on a "subordinate" feature.5 0 Failure to request the
"subordinate" feature instruction leaves the judge with discretion wheth-
er to charge the jury on the issue.5 The instruction about defendant's
failure to testify has been classified as relating to a subordinate feature
of a case,5" 2 and thus the question arises whether the judge's discretion to
instruct in the absence of a request should be retained. Several jurisdic-
tions allow the judge to use his discretion but subject it to the defend-
ant's right to object."3 If the accused offers an objection to the judge's
proposed instruction, it is error for the judge to give the instruction.
In North Carolina, however, attorneys are not required to object to
errors in an instruction in order to preserve the error for appeal; 5' and
even if they do object, it is not necessarily erroneous for the judge to
instruct over their objections. The alternatives for implementing the
rule that the sua sponte charge is error are thus either to remove the
judge's discretion to charge when the defendant does not request the
instruction or to retain the discretion and to require the defendant to
object if he thinks the instruction will call undue attention to his silence.
Since a judge-made rule currently excuses the defendant from objecting
in criminal actions,55 the court itself could change the rule and require
the accused to object at trial if he wishes to bar comment on his right to
silence. If the judge then instructed over the defendant's objection, the
charge would be erroneous. Either of these alternatives would allow
"defendant's counsel [to] observe the entire proceedings and make his
49. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939). See Note, Comments to the Jury
on Defendant's Failure to Testify, 64 DICK. L. REv. 164.
50. Broun, North Carolina Jury Instruction Practice-Is It Time to Get the Judge
Off the Tightrope?, 52 N.C.L. REv. 719, 720 (1974).
51. State v. Powell, 11 N.C. App. 465, 474, 181 S.E.2d 754, 760 (1971).
52. State v. Rainey, 236 N.C. 738, 741, 74 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1953).
53. E.g., United States v. Smith, 392 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1968) (dictum); Russell v.
State, 240 Ark. 97, 398 S.W.2d 213 (1966); Gross v. State, 261 Ind. 489, 306 N.E.2d
371 (1974).
54. Broun, supra note 50, at 720.
55. Id. Professor Broun points out that N.C.R. Civ. P. 46(c) excuses attorneys
from objecting to the charge in civil cases. Id. at 720 n.6. Broun argues for requiring
objections to preserve error for appeal in civil and criminal cases, with an exception for
"plain error." Id. at 733-34.
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choice after he has determined whether an instruction is needed to
protect the defendant's rights in the particular case." 56 In addition, the
choice would be given "to the one whose rights are at stake; hence, if
defendant [were] ultimately prejudiced by his selection, he [would]
have no cause to complain."57
Regardless of whether the rule is changed to allow the defendant
an absolute choice about giving the instruction, North Carolina's appel-
late courts should enforce their frequently repeated suggestion that the
words of the statute or the available pattern instruction be used in
charging the jury.5" The instruction in Caron is a flagrant example of
the ineffectiveness of these mere warnings to the trial courts. It is
difficult to believe that such an instruction could not prejudice the
defendant's right to remain silent, and when the means to assure that the
instruction is properly given are so readily available, failure to do so is
inexcusable.
The "natural inference" that a defendant who does not testify in his
own behalf must be guilty runs counter to the law's presumption of
innocence and to the accused's privilege of silence. Innocent defend-
ants who decline to testify do exist; their silence may be prompted by
fear of impeachment through the introduction of evidence of bad char-
acter or prior conviction, by fear that under the pressure of cross-
examination their demeanor may adversely affect the jury, or by fear of
exposing matters remotely related to the charges.59 If the defendant,
innocent or guilty, "is to have the unfettered right to testify or not to
testify he should have a correlative right to say whether or not his silence
should be singled out for the jury's attention."6  State v. Caron is the
latest example of the North Carolina Supreme Court's willingness to pay
lip service to this right of the defendant while refusing to enforce the
right.
BARBARA C. RUBY
56. Note, 64 DicK. L. REv. supra note 17, at 171.
57. Id.
58. See notes 44-45 and accompanying text supra.
59. Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893); C. McCoemnce, HAND3ooK
oP THE LAW OF EVmENCE § 118 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at
§ 2272.
60. Russell v. State, 240 Ark. 97, 100, 398 S.W.2d 213, 215 (1966).
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